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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal by the Plaintiff, Margaret Reynolds, 
from a verdict and judgment entered in the District Court 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, finding the issues in 
favor of the Defendants W. W. Clyde & Co., and Fred Gray, 
for no cause of action in a suit filed by the plaintiff against 
the defendants for injuries to the plaintiff caused by the 
alleged negligence of the defendants. Plaintiff will be here-
inafter referred to as the appellant, and the defendant will 
be hereinafter referred to as the respondents. 
The appellant filed an action in the District court of 
Salt Lake County, on October 7, 1953, alleging that on the 
17th day of September, 1953, at 7:00 a.m., the appellant 
W. W. Clyde and Co., was engaged in constructing ap-
proaches to an overpass West of U. S. Highway 91 in the 
vicinity of Becks Hot Springs in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, and at the said time and place the respondent, 
Fred Gray was an employee of the Respondent W. W. Clyde 
& Co. and among the duties of the employment of Fred 
Gray was that of stopping traffic along U.S. highway 91 
to allow the earth-moving vehicles and equipment of W. W. 
Clyde and Co., to cross the highway free from interference 
of the general traffic on said highway; that the appellant 
at the time was driving an automobile Northerly along the 
East side of U.S. Highway 91, and slowed down upon ar-
riving at the crossing; that the respondent, Fred Gray be-
gan waving a red flag in such a manner that the appellant 
reasonably assumed that he intended for the appellant to 
continue forward rather than to stop; that the plaintiff 
continued forward and as her vehicle passed_ the respondent 
Fred Gray, the flag of the respondent negligently contacted 
the two side windows on the right side of the vehicle 
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driven by appellant violently shattering the glass and 
startling the plaintiff to the extent that the appellant 
became unnerved, frightened, upset and excited causing 
the appellant to temporarily lose control of the vehicle 
which veared to the West toward oncoming traffic before 
the plaintiff regained sufficient stability to right the course 
of the automobile, all of which caused the twisting, dis .. 
location, and concussion of the plaintiff's back and nervous 
system. 
The complaint and the amended complaints alleged in 
different counts that the acts of Fred Gray, were willful 
and wanton, but during the trial it was stipulated between 
the attorneys for the respective parties that the issue vvould 
be tried solely on the question of negligence. 
The evidence was undisputed that the appellant was 
examined by Dr. Robert Lamb on September 25, 1953, 
who diagnosed an injury consisting of a protruded inter-
vertebral disc, at the lumbarsacral joint (R 37). The non 
surgical treatment failed to correct the injury and on May 
21, 1954, appellant was admitted to the hospital for ex-
cision of this protruded disc (R 41). The undisputed evi-
dence further shows that the appellant spent $1477.30 
for doctors, hospital, and drug charges in connection with 
the treatment of the injury to her back. 
The appellant testified that on the morning of Sep-
tember 17, 1953, she v;as traveling Northerly on U.S. High-
way 91, going from Salt Lake City to her place of employ-
ment 'in Bountiful; that U.S. Highway 91, at the vicinity 
of Becks Crossing is a four-lane highway; that if the lanes 
were numbered 1, 2, 3, and 4, starting from East to West, 
the appellant was traveling in lane 1 (R 18); that as appel-
lant approached Becks Crossing she slowed down antici-
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pating the presence of the flagman; that the flagman was 
standing on the East side of the highway on the shoulder, 
just off the pavement; that the flagman had a red flag on 
the end of a pole and was waving it in a direction parallel 
with the road and holding the flag down below his waist 
(R 20); that another vehicle was proceeding ahead of the 
appellant in the same direction and the appellant assumed 
that the flagman was waving appellant to proceed forward; 
that appellant proceeded forward in lane 1, and as she 
passed the flagman, she noticed from the corner of her 
eye that the flag pole of the flagman struck the wind wing 
of the car shattering the right front window of the car 
(R 20); that the noise of impact and shattering glass 
frightened and unnerved the appellant so that she lost 
control of her car to the extent that her car was in lane 
3 before she could right it and turn back to the right hand 
side of the road (R 21); that appellant's left hip bumped 
against the arm rest on the door as she was turning the 
vehicle; that the South bound traffic in lanes 3 and 4 were 
approaching and moving at the same time that appellant 
was traveling North and there were no earth moving ve-
hicles or trucks crossing the highway at that time; that 
appellant stopped on the East side of the road a short dis-
tance from the flagman and then proceeded another hund-
red and fifty feet or so, noticed her arm was bleeding, 
stopped, got out, and brushed glass from the seat (R 22); 
that she then proceeded to Bountiful, to her place of em-
ployment and there informed her co-workers of the incident 
and also notified the deputy marshal of Bountiful (R 23); 
that upon arrival at Bountiful she felt pain in her lower 
back region (R 23); that September 17, 1953, was Thursday; 
that she continued at work Thursday and Friday but was 
not able to report Saturday; that on Monday she was feeling 
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badly and consulted Dr. Diumenti, (R 27) who referred her 
to Dr. Lamb, who examined her on September 25, 1953, 
and subsequently operated to excise the protruded disc 
(R 37); that appellant had no previous injury to her back 
which prevented her from doing her work and that she 
was capable of doing all of her household chores and engage 
in dancing and other types of recreation such as bowling 
(R 61 & 62) ; that since September 17, 1953, appellant has 
been unable to do anything which requires bertding, stoop-, 
ing, or lifting (R 62). 
Leo Monks, deputy marshal of Bountiful, Utah, was 
called and testified that on September 17, 1953, he was 
deputy marshal and was acquainted vvith the appellant 
(R 85); that on said date there was a report made to him 
regarding the incident on U.S. Highway 91, and that t~e 
incident involved a flagman; that he inspected the auto-
mobile of Mrs. Reynolds at the time of the report and ob-
served that the right front windovv on the right hand side 
was cracked (R' 86) ; that at the time the report of the 
incident was made by appellant to the marshal, the appel-
lant appeared very nervous, upset, and shaky, in contrast 
to her usual calm appearance; that the incident was re-
ported to the marshal between 8:00 and 9:00 o'clock of 
September 17, 1953 (R 87). 
Ronald Bradshaw, manager and owner of the Inter-
mountain Glass Co., at Bountiful, testified that sometime 
during the middle of September, 1953, a vehicle was brought 
to him by Mrs. Reynolds for purposes of glass replacement 
(R 90) ; that the right ventilator glass on the vehicle was 
quite badly shattered and the door glass was cracked; that 
he replaced both the ventilator glass and the door glass 
(R 91). 
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One of the respondents, Fred Gray, was called as an 
adverse witness by the appellant (R 95). The respondent, 
Fred Gray, was the only eye witness to the incident which 
was the subject of the action. Gray testified that he was 
first employed by W. W. Clyde on August 3, 1953 (R 95); 
that he was assigned to the job of flagging traffic on the 
. highway was given a stop sign and a red flag as equipment 
(R 97) ; that the stop sign was only used for a short period 
and then was discontinued and was not being used at the 
time of this the incident which was the subject of this ac-
tion; that he continued to work flagging traffic until Decem-
ber 4, 1953 (R 103); that he remembered an incident when a 
lady driving an automobile passed his flag and then stopped 
a fe\v feet down the road; that she was traveling in lane 
1, when Gray stepped out to flag between lane # 1 and 2, 
and that the lady ran through his flag (R 106); that Gray 
was flagging by waving his right arm up and down holding 
the flag; that Gray said he did not know whether the 
vehicle struck the flag (R 106); that after the lady passed, 
she ran up on the second lane and continued up the road 
about a hundred feet from where Gray stood and got out 
of her car on the right side (R 107) ; that this lady did not 
return to have any conversation with Gray (R 107); that 
the only other experience Gray ever had was when a lady 
ran through his flag and then came back to apologize for 
running through the flag (R 107). On direct examination, 
Mr. Gray was asked the following question: 
Q. Mr. Gray, you said that you never did feel any 
impact between your stick and the automobile, is 
that right, at any time? 
A. No, if anything like that happened it was an 
accident because she run through my flag and I 
was trying to stop her and if I hit the car, I hit it 
accidentally. (R 109) 
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then Gray further testified as follows: (R 109) 
Q. Do you know whether or not you contacted 
the car? 
A. No, I don't. 
Q. You don't ever remember feeling it? 
A. No. 
Q. You said you watched this lady go off to the 
east side of the road and stop? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Why did you watch her? 
A. Because I was watching them loads coming 
down the hill and I was watching where she was 
going. I was wondering "'here she was going. 
Q. Why were you watching the loads, coming 
down the hill? 
A. Because we had all the traffic stopped. He 
had his traffic stopped and I had mine stopped and 
she was the only one that went through my flag. 
Q. Did she stop at any time? 
A. No. Until she got up there and stopped 
about a hundred feet from where I was standing. 
Q. She never stopped at any time? 
A. No. 
Q. She came right on through lane two and went 
on by you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You said all the traffic was stopped? 
A. They was. The outside lane. And I was in 
there standing there, standing at the middle be-
tween one and two and when she come through I 
was trying to flag her and she was the only car that 
went through. 
Q. Did she dodge you to get through? 
A. I stepped back. 
Q. You stepped back; what for? 
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A. So she wouldn't run over me. I was standing 
right on that between the two lanes one and two. 
Q. You were standing between the two lanes and 
where was she? 
A. I was standing right on that line between one 
and two. 
Q. You would say on the line that divides lane 
one and two? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where was her automobile? , 
A. It came up the second lane and went up there 
and crossed over and stopped. 
Q. Were there any cars stopped in lane one? 
A. Yes sir, there were cars stopped, and there 
wasn't a car-this car up above is all. 
Q. You were standing right on the line between 
lane one and two? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You hp.d to step back from that line in order to 
keep from getting hit? 
A. Yes, I wasn't going to stand there and let her 
run over me. 
Gray further testified that he was the only watchman 
ever on duty at the south end of the road during the 
period (R 110). 
The cause was submitted to the jury by instruction 
essentially i= embracing negligence and contributary neg-
ligence. The jury tvas polled} and the results thereof 
sho·wed · six in favor of the decision and two opposed. 
CR 203). 
The appellant then moved the court as follows: 
1. To set aside the verdict of the jury, and any 
judgment· entered thereon, and to enter judgment in favor 
of the plaintiff. 
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2. If the court does not see fit to grant the relief 
requested in paragraph 1, hereof, plaintiff moves the court 
for an order granting a new trial herein for the reason that 
the verdict is against the evidence and is not justified by 
the evidence adduced in this cause. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Point I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION 
OF THE APPELLANT TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT 
OF THE JURY AND TO ENTER JUDGMENT IN FAVOR 
OF THE PLAINTIFF. 
Point ll 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION 
OF THE APPELLANT FOR AN ORDER GRANTING A 
NEW TRIAL FOR THE REASON THAT THE VERDICT 
WAS AGAINST THE EVIDENCE. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION 
OF THE APPELLANT TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT 
OF THE JURY AND TO ENTER JUDGMENT IN FAVOR 
OF THE PLAINTIFF. 
In this case the jury in order to find in favor of the 
respondent for no cause of action would have to find either 
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(A) That no such incident as claimed by the appellant 
transpired or 
(B) That the appellant, herself was contributo~y negli-
gent. 
The statement of facts (supra) set forth the appellants 
version of how the defendant, Gray's flag contacted the 
windows of her vehicle, and her testimony as to the damage 
was confirmed by the testimony of the deputy marshal, 
Leo Monks, and the glass repairman, Ronald Bradshaw. 
The only other evidence of the incident was given by the 
respondent, Gray. The respondent, Gray, testified (R 105) 
that he recalled an incident when a lady driving an auto-
mobile passed his flag signal and then stopped a few feet 
down the road; that he couldn't remember the date or the 
day of the week; that he did not talk to the lady; that the 
lady ran through his flag, and that he doesn't remember 
if her car struck the flag as she passed; that she was in the 
second lane, and after she ran by, she cut across and went 
up about a hundred feet from where he stood and got out 
of her car on the right side; that the lady did not come 
back to talk to him; that the only other experience he 
ever remembers was when a lady ran though his flag and 
stopped on the side of the road and then came back and 
apologized, but he knew of no other instances. 
The respondent, Gray, further testified as set forth in 
the statement of facts (supra-R 109). There can be little 
doubt that the respondent, Gray, was relating the same 
incident to which the appellant had reference. Apparently 
the incident was so significant that the respondent, Gray, 
remembered in considerable detail just what had transpired, 
even though he had been on duty since August 3, 1953, as a 
flagman on a heavily traveled U.S. Highway 91. 
10~ 
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Therefore, if the jury concluded that the incident did 
not happen at all, their decision is not supported by the 
evidence in any respect and should have been set aside. 
As to the problem of whether or not the jury could 
have found the appellant guilty of contributary negligence, 
the respondent, Gray, was a private citizen, not a police 
officer, directing traffic solely for the benefit of his em-
ployer. While the respondent may have had a contractual 
responsibility to regulate and protect the public by use of 
a flagman, this responsibility did not include police power, 
and the respondent \Vas acting as a private citizen in the 
performance of the flagging operations. Assuming then 
that the respondent vvas flagging properly and not am-
biguously, and that the appellant disregarded the signal, 
the appellant would not have been under any legal duty 
to heed the signal of the respondent, a private citizen. 
(Sadlowski vs. Meeron, et al., Mich 306, 215 N W 422). 
The appellant's testimony was that the respondent's flag 
was down at his side at the time she started to pass the 
respondent (R 20); whereas the respondent Gray, testified 
that he was standing between lanes one and two and that 
as appellant approached, respondent stepped back in order 
to keep from getting hit (R 110), and that if there were 
any impact between the stick and the automobile, it was 
an accident, because appellant ran through the flag and 
respondent was trying to stop her, and if respondent hit 
the appellant's car he hit it accidentally (R 109 lines 1 
to 5). 
The respondent, Gray's, testimony was such that it 
is difficult to determine what his impression of the incident 
really was. If in fact, the respondent, Gray, stepped back 
as the appellant's car approached, there would have been 
11 
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no contact at all between the respondent's flag and the 
appellant's car; while the respondent was reluctant to 
admit any contact between the. flag and the car, the inci-
dent of the lady passing through and stopping on the east 
side. of . the road was sufficiently clear in his mind in detail 
and he was willing to admit that if his flag did hit the car, 
it hit accidentally. To avoid the flag contacting the ap-
pellant's car, the respondent need only to have lowered the 
flag. Respondent, Gray, said he had traffic stop in lane 1, 
and that he was standing on the line between lane 1 and 2, 
and that as appellant came by, the appellant stepped back 
to keep from getting hit. If this were true, the appellant's 
car could not have come near enough to respondent to con-
tact the flag, since the respondent testified that the ap-
pellant was always in lane two. The only conceiveable 
way that the jury could have found the plaintiff guilty of 
contributory negligencce would be a situation \vhere the 
respondent, Gray, would be standing with his flag extended 
horizontally at about the level of the windows of the auto-
mobile, and that the appellant, having sufficient time and 
opportunity to stop or otherwise avoid the flag, neverthe-
less drove against the flag; but nowhere in the evidence 
can the existence of this situation be found. 
In a£parent disregard of the necessity to avoid am-
biguity ~ signaling, the respondent, Gray, testified that 
the stop sign which was given to him by his employer to 
use in conjunction with the flag, which had clearly written 
on it the word stop, was not used by the respondent, Gray, 
after about a week (R 98) and that the respondent, Gray, 
discontinued the use of said sign upon his own initiative 
and without the instruction of his employer. 
12 
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Point n 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MO-
TION OF THE APPELLANT FOR AN ORDER GRANT-
ING A NEW TRIAL FOR THE VERDICT WAS AGAINST 
THE EVIDENCE. 
The argument advanced in support of point # 1 should 
apply with even greater force and affect to this argument 
under point #2. The duty of a trial judge in considering a 
motion for new trial is set forth in King v Union R. R. Co. 
-U-, 212 P2d 692, at page 696, where this court held as 
follows: 
''The duty of a trial judge in considering a 
motion for a new trial was well stated in Nelson v 
Angeles Hospital Ass'n of Los Angeles, 23 Cal. App. 
2d 71, 72 P. 2d 169, 171. There the court said: 
" 'The law is well established that, on considera-
tion of a motion for a new trial on the ground of 
insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict 
or decision, a trial court is not particularly con-
cerned with the fact (if it so appear) that *** the 
evidence is 'conflicting.' To the contrary, not-
withstanding any such conflict, or even though the 
apparent weight of the evidence should be in sup-
port of the 'verdict or decision,' since it is the 
personal duty of the trial judge to weigh and to 
consider the evidence and to reach a just conclusion 
thereon, if he be satisfied that the verdict or de-
cision in question is not in fact supported by the 
evidence} or that it is contrary to the weight of the 
evidence} he is not only authorized} but it is his 
bounden duty to grant a motion for a new trial. 
20 Cal. Jur. 117, 118, and authorities there cited. 
In such a situation, on appeal from the order, all 
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that is required to sustain it is the fact that the 
record discloses substantial evidence in support of 
the conclusion that has been reached by the trial 
court in that respect.' '' 
The· trial judge in the instant case at the time of 
hearing on the motion for a new trial stated that while, 
as a trier of fact he may have reached a different conclusion, 
yet he did not feel that the trial judge should substitute his 
own opinion or judgment for that of the jury. If this were 
the position to be taken by all trial judges, there would be 
no in~tance in which the court would grant a new trial. 
It would seem then that the trial court should have exer-
cised his duty to grant the motion for a new trial if the 
verdict were against the weight of the evidence, and failure 
to do so is an abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the cause should be 
remanded to the lower court for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE K. FADEL 
Bountiful, Utah 
RAYMOND R. BRADY 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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